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WHAT IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST 
RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS REMOVED AND 
UNREMOVED INDIAN NATIONS? 
Ann C. Juliano* 
The question of removed and unremoved Indian nations competing 
with each other arises here in New York in the context of the land 
claims. There is also a land claim which has been filed in Pennsylvania. 
There are no federally recognized tribes in Pennsylvania and thus, there 
is an issue of a removed tribe returning to exercise jurisdiction. This 
raises the next question: what kind of jurisdiction do returning removed 
tribes have, and, given that removal policy across the country, can these 
types of cases arise in any number of states? 
When considering the federal government's trust responsibility, 
one must consider the unique context of the federal government. It has 
many obligations imposed by statutes and then it has the trust 
responsibility, which does not spring out of a statute. As I have argued 
before, the federal government has an inherent conflict when it comes to 
the trust responsibility because the same government officials are 
making litigation decisions in actions to benefit tribes and in actions 
brought by tribes against the govequnent. 1 These officials have to 
decide what positions to take in litigation and, ultimately, the same 
people are making those decisions for and against Indian interests. So, I 
usually think of a conflict in the trust responsibility as a conflict 
between Indian interests and non-Indian interests. The question here is 
particularly interesting because it is a question of competing tribal 
interests. Therefore, determining the government's trust responsibility 
towards removed and unremoved nations, in some instances, is really a 
question of determining how the trust responsibility should apply when 
there are competing tribal interests. 
I will not address the questions raised by many here of how the 
federal government should be involved in the land claim litigation, what 
they should do in the negotiations, or what they should do in the 
settlement, other than to say I think it is proper that the federal 
government either intervene in the ongoing claims to support the tribes 
or bring claims to support the tribes when there have been illegal 
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transactions in the past. 
There are two questions to consider in the area of competing tribal 
interests. First, should the federal government seek to acquire lands, the 
return of lands for removed nations and/or support tribal jurisdiction 
over such returned lands? Second, in reaching this decision, should the 
federal government consider the interests of non-Indians or the interests 
of the unremoved nations? 
To answer those questions, you must start with what are the 
purposes of trust responsibility, and how should we define the trust 
responsibility? 
There are two ways to view the trust responsibility: affirmatively 
or negatively. In the affirmative view, when we begin a decision-
making process, we ask: What must the federal government do, in this 
particular situation, to fulfill its trust responsibility? How do we define 
the obligations upon the federal government? 
The negative or defensive way to think about the trust 
responsibility is: if the government takes this action, or after it has 
acted, is it liable for breach of trust? Note that I am pretending that the 
second question does not drive the first question. That is, the 
government does not take action based solely on whether or not it will 
be liable for breach of trust. The affirmative method of contemplating 
the trust responsibility is a more powerful tool for tribal advocates 
because some Supreme Court cases, which I will discuss later, limit 
breach of trust actions. 
The history and development of the trust responsibility has been 
reviewed earlier today. Let me reiterate a few simple points. It is 
generally accepted that the trust responsibility arose from the Cherokee 
Trilogy cases. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justice Marshall created 
the guardian-ward relationship.2 This relationship imposes some 
obligations on the federal government because the government serves as 
a guardian. In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall held that tribes 
possessed sovereign rights which freed them from state control. In 
addition, he referred to Indian Nations as taking protection from the 
federal government. 3 The positive view is that the government owes 
protection to Indian Nations and thus, has some obligations to Indian 
Nations. The judicial and the executive branches have spent the last 170 
years trying to give meaning to these obligations. 
With one notable exception, the courts have become increasingly 
2. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
3. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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willing to apply private trust principles to the federal government's 
relationship with Indian nations. In a recent Supreme Court case, White 
Mountain Apache, Justice Souter held that elementary trust law 
confirms the common sense assumption that a fiduciary, who actually 
administers trust property, may not allow it to fall into ruin on his 
watch. 4 It seems pretty clear. If you are administering a trust as a 
trustee and dealing with trust property, you have a duty "to preserve and 
maintain trust assets." The Court reached this conclusion even though 
the statutes at issue that created this duty on the government did not 
expressly subject the government to duties of management and 
conservation. The statute did not explicitly require the government to 
conserve the assets. The fact that the property was occupied by the 
United States, as trustee, was enough to obligate the government to 
preserve property improvements. Thus, the United States has an 
obligation to preserve and maintain tribal assets, including land and 
natural resources. 
I would argue that the more fundamental trust asset that the United 
States has is a duty to protect tribal sovereignty and tribal jurisdiction. 
Others have reached the same conclusion. One argued that, under the 
Cherokee cases, the chief objective of the trust responsibility is to 
protect tribal status as self-governing entities. 5 
Therefore, as trustee, the federal government should seek to protect 
the tribes from encroachment by States, should vigorously defend tribes 
against the exercise of state authority in Indian country, and, of course, 
should seek to enforce the law. In doing so, the federal government 
should seek to establish and protect tribal sovereignty and do so in a 
way to best protect tribal sovereignty. This is where the City of Sherrill 
case comes in. 6 
In the City of Sherrill case, the Second Circuit Court affirmed the 
lower court's decision that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York's 
purchase of fee-land within its historic reservation, recognized by the 
1794 Treaty of Canandaigua, is exempt from state and municipal taxes. 
Taxation turns on the question of whether or not the properties are in 
Indian country. Under well-established case law, reservation land is 
Indian country. It is land set aside by the federal government for Indian 
use thereby meeting the definition of Indian country. The purchase of 
the land even in the absence of the United States taking the land into 
4. See U.S. v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
5. Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to 
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975). 
6. See Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139 (2003). 
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trust, re-establishes the property as reservation land. Because the federal 
government never ended the reservation status of the land, the land 
remains as Indian country. The Second Circuit rejected an argument 
that the land has to be taken into trust for it to be tax-exempt. Further, 
the Second Circuit rejected arguments that the reservation had been 
disestablished because the Court found there was no clear 
Congressional intent to disestablish. 
This case provides the federal government with a means to 
establish an expanding tribal jurisdiction base, without having to take 
land into trust. Of course, other Indian nations, which are signatories to 
the 1794 Treaty, may face different results because of the differing 
treaty language, different evidence, and the possibility of Congressional 
intent to disestablish. 
Now, at this point, I have not discussed the interests of non-
beneficiaries to the trust relationship. Under private trust law 
principles, the interests of non-beneficiaries should not come into play 
in the government's decision-making in reference to Indian Nations. In 
representing a beneficiary, the government should be thinking solely of 
the best interests of the beneficiary. 
This leads me to the negative or defensive use of the trust 
responsibility. If the United States takes a particular position or a 
particular action, when does that decision amount to a violation of the 
trust responsibility such that would require the payment of money 
damages? In a pair of cases, the Supreme Court held that in order to 
receive money damages, there has to be a substantive right that can be 
interpreted as giving rise to a claim for money damages. 7 There must be 
a comprehensive statutory scheme or the assumption of elaborate 
control by the government over the property of Indians. 
There is no statutory scheme dealing with competing tribal 
interests. In fact, the land into trust provisions that I am going to talk 
about in a minute, simply require the consideration of certain factors. 
The statutes do not say anything about what decision you should reach. 
There is nothing specific in statute or regulations that would allow a 
tribe to sue for any particular decision the United States makes with 
regard to competing tribal interests, in terms of money damages. You 
could get equitable relief, but not money damages. 
The Supreme Court discussed breach of trust and the concept of 
competing interests in the Nevada case. 8 The Court said that the 
7. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell/); United States v. 
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell//). 
8. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). 
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government may fulfill its obligation to represent Indian tribes in 
litigation even if Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as 
well. This case involved water rights where, because the United States 
was representing other statutorily-imposed interests, it did not ask for as 
much water for the tribe as it should have. The tribe sought to re-open 
that decree years later and the Supreme Court said that Congress told 
the Department of the Interior that it must represent Indian and non-
Indian interests. Thus, there is no disabling conflict. The Justice 
Department has interpreted this holding to mean that there is never a 
conflict when you deal with competing interests. That is sort of a 
mantra the Justice Department has. In Nevada, there is no conflict. I 
have lots to say on Nevada and the government's use of Nevada, but 
that is for another time. 
Lower courts have held that Nevada holds merely that the duty of 
undivided loyalty that the private trustee has does not apply to the 
United States because it simply cannot. The federal government has too 
many responsibilities to apply these particular private trust principles. 
If you combine Mitchell and Nevada, consideration of non-Indian 
interests or consideration of competing tribal interests does not amount 
to a breach of the trust responsibility. The negative concept of the trust 
responsibility does not provide any aid in determining what the 
government's response should be to competing tribal interests. 
Let us then return to the affirmative concept of the trust 
responsibility. If the affirmative obligation of the trust responsibility is 
to protect tribal assets and to expand and protect tribal jurisdiction, the 
United States should pro-actively take land into trusts. By taking land 
into trust, the federal government will help tribes avoid the fight of 
whether or not land is Indian country. The main provision for taking 
land into trust is 25 U.S.C. §465, wherein the Secretary of Interior is 
authorized to exercise her discretion to acquire any interest in lands for 
the purpose of providing lands for Indians. Under the statute and 
implementing regulations, title is taken in the name of the United States 
in trust for the tribe. The land is exempt from State and local taxation. 
The land may be acquired for a tribe in trust status when it is located 
within the exterior boundaries of the tribe's reservation, within the 
reservation or adjacent thereto, when the tribe already owns an interest 
in the land, and when the Secretary determines that the acquisition is 
necessary for tribal self-determination, economic development, or 
Indian housing.9 An important factor, then, is if the property is located 
9. 25 C.F.R. Pt. 151. 
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within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation. This factor requires a 
definition of "reservation." The City of Sherrill case tells us that any 
land within a non-disestablished reservation should be considered a 
reservation. The regulations say an Indian Reservation is any area of 
land over which the tribe is recognized by the United States as having 
jurisdiction. It is, to say the least, a circular argument. 
When the land is within a reservation, the Secretary has to consider 
numerous factors. The important one for our discussion is: if you are 
acquiring land that is in fee status, you have to consider the impact on 
the State and the municipalities resulting from the removal of the land 
from the tax rolls. 10 Then, you have to contemplate the jurisdictional 
problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise. I I Thus, 
these factors take into account interests of non-Indian and possibly 
interests of competing tribes. 
If the land to be acquired is off reservation, the Secretary has to 
consider the same criteria plus the location of the land relative to State 
boundaries and its distance from the tribe's reservation. I2 The greater 
the distance from the tribe's reservation the land is the greater scrutiny 
the Secretary shall give to the tribe's justification of anticipated 
benefits. Further, the Secretary has to notify State and local 
governments and give them comment time of the potential impact on 
jurisdiction, taxes, and special assessments. I3 Thus, there are different 
considerations if the land is off reservation. 
To summarize then, under the statute and these regulations, the 
Secretary has to consider jurisdictional problems, tax issues, and has to 
treat reservation land differently from off reservation land. 
A second method to acquire land in trust is under the Indian 
Gaming Regulations Act (IGRA). IGRA prohibits tribes from gaming 
on lands acquired by the Secretary after October 17th, 1988, unless the 
lands are within or contiguous to a reservation (again raising the 
question of what counts as a reservation) or the tribe can show that the 
gaming establishment would be in the best interests of the tribe and its 
members and not detrimental to the surrounding community.I4 In 
addition, the Secretary must consult with local officials, including 
officials of nearby tribes, and the governor of the state has to concur. Is 
10. 25 C.F.R. § 151.IO(e). 
11. 25 C.F.R. § 151.IO(f). 
12. 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 l(b). 
13. 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 l(d). 
14. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(l)(A). 
15. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(l)(A). 
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In other words, the Secretary has to consider non-Indian and competing 
tribal interests but the statute does not say what the result should be. 
The Secretary has to consult these parties but the statute does not say 
what happens if they all oppose it. This is simply a question of 
administrative procedure. If you can prove the Secretary did not consult 
these parties, then you can prove the Secretary violated procedure. 
However, it does not help with our initial question of how the United 
States is supposed to make its decision of what to do under the trust 
responsibility. 
Case law that deals with competing tribal interests almost always 
arises in the context of intervention or in the context of indispensable 
parties. Is there someone who really has to be in this lawsuit? If they 
are not in this lawsuit, can we still go forward with this lawsuit? As a 
result, we have cases where the United States is suing or is being sued 
over action taken with respect to a particular tribe. In essence, the 
federal government does something with respect to a particular tribe, 
and another tribe seeks to intervene or argues that an absent tribe is 
indispensable, but cannot be joined because of their sovereign 
immunity. 
In these cases, the courts have held that where there are several 
tribes involved, the United States ~annot adequately represent the absent 
tribes. One example is a fish management plan that covers a whole 
bunch of treaty tribes and a challenge to the management plan by one 
tribe. 16 Also, there are 23 other absent tribes who are not involved in the 
lawsuit. The court held that the government could not represent the 
interests of the absent tribes because the interests all conflict among 
themselves. The government cannot represent the interests of those 
absent tribes; therefore, the court dismissed the whole lawsuit. 
In another case, there was a plan for a distribution of funds from 
land that had been held for three different tribes. 17 The three tribes sued 
in various permutations over different claims. The court said the 
government could not represent all tribes and that whatever the 
allegiance the government owes to the tribes as trustee is necessarily 
split among the three competing tribes. 
Perhaps most on point is in a gaming case, in which the Wyandotte 
Tribe asked for land to be taken into trust, the Secretary approved it, and 
other tribes sued to stop the land from being taken into trust. 18 Since the 
16. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
17. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
18. Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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Wynadottes were not in the case, the Appellate Court addressed whether 
they had to be brought into the case and, since they cannot be brought 
into the case because they have sovereign immunity, whether the case 
should be dismissed. The court said their ability to conduct gaming on 
their land will only survive if all of the Secretary's determinations are 
upheld. The Secretary's interest in defending his determinations is 
virtually identical to the tribe's interest, and therefore, the case may 
proceed. Even though the tribes who brought the case and the 
Wyandottes are in conflict, the Secretary can still go forward and 
represent the Wyandottes. 
These cases tell us that the United States cannot represent 
competing tribes when there is a conflict between tribes and then we 
allow tribes to intervene to represent their own interests. But again, how 
to formulate a decision to interfere in the first place remains unclear. 
So, what are the options for the United States in trying to formulate 
a decision in the first place? First, I think that the United States should 
not take sides between tribes, but sometimes it has to. When one tribe 
asks for an action and another tribe opposes the action, the United States 
has to make a decision. 
If we reconfigure the situation and say that a tribe asks for some 
action and a non-Indian interest opposes it, how much weight should the 
non-Indian interest have under private trust principles? None. Non-
tribal interests should have no weight in the consideration of what the 
trustee should do for its beneficiary. It should only determine what is in 
the best interests of the beneficiary without contemplating other 
interests, unless required to do so under those regulations I mentioned. 
Sometimes the federal government is required to consider other 
interests. If it is not required to do so, it should not. 
You could take the same approach to competing tribal interests. 
The United States should only contemplate the interest of the tribe 
requesting the action to the exclusion of other tribal interests. However, 
the United States has a trust responsibility to all tribes. It really should 
contemplate what is in the best interests of all tribes. The question then 
is: as we contemplate all tribes, is there any principled way to order the 
obligations between removed and unremoved tribes? 
You could argue that the United States has made its priorities clear 
through treaties. Some tribes were allowed to stay, some tribes were 
not. The obligation is to protect the rights granted under the treaties. 
However, you could also argue that the U.S. is responsible for removing 
tribes and, therefore, should support a return to indigenous lands. 
Further, it is wrong to suggest that tribes should not act to protect 
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their own self interests by opposing operations which would impact 
them economically. To do so would require, through some sense of 
racial solidarity, a subjugation of interests that we do not require from 
other sovereigns. We do not expect New York to consider what is in 
the best interest of Connecticut before it does anything. So why should 
we expect tribes to adopt that approach? 
At bottom, the United States should not decide between competing 
interests based on a tribe's economic advantage. This is not an 
appropriate use of the trust responsibility. The United States should 
consider what is in the best interests of the tribe at issue. To the extent 
other tribes object, then the United States should consider the effect on 
the objecting tribes' sovereignty and jurisdiction, with an eye towards, 
at all times, expanding, improving and strengthening tribal jurisdiction 
and sovereignty. The loss of economic advantage should not play a 
deciding role. 
Within a specific context of the New York land claims, the U.S. 
has backed away from the position of seeking ejectment of individual 
landowners. District court judges are not allowing ejectment as a 
remedy against landowners and they will not allow the addition of 
individual landowners. 19 Money damages are the replacement remedy, 
which we have heard from some speakers here today is not an 
acceptable remedy. But purchasing land in the claim area is exactly 
what Judge McCum envisioned when he awarded money damages. In 
the Cayuga case, the Court held: 
As the Court envisions it, eventually, the Cayugas will have the 
financial means to purchase land within the claim area from willing 
sellers. When that is done, the Cayugas will, once again, have a 
homeland where their culture can thrive and they can reach their 
objectives such as economic, political and cultural development, 
which can be reached without ejecting thousands upon thousands of 
landowners. 20 
The U.S. should support the use of money damages by claimant 
tribes, including supporting removed tribes by purchasing land in the 
claim area. Such support will encourage the establishment of Indian 
country and encourage tribal jurisdiction. 
In the case known as the Moe Lake case: "This case pits one group 
of Indian tribes, who hope to open a new gambling facility, against 
19. See e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 
61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
20. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuoma, 1999 WL 509442 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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another tribe that currently runs another gambling facility nearby."21 
Two tribes formed a partnership with a non-tribal entity to acquire a 
struggling greyhound track and asked Interior to take the property into 
trust. Another tribe had a reservation nearby and opposed the racetrack. 
That tribe predicted that the proposed casino would have a detrimental 
impact on the gaming revenues it derived from its two casinos and the 
loss of revenue would harm the quality of life on the reservation. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) area office decided that IGRA 
§2719 had been met, so the government could take the land into trust. 
At this point, federal elected officials and the other tribes got involved. 
They expressed concern about the effect of the new casino and met with 
higher ranking BIA officials. Interior then told the partnership that it 
failed to demonstrate that the new casino would not have a detrimental 
impact on the surrounding community. The partnership filed suit. This 
case led to a special prosecutor and an investigation of various 
employees at Interior. There was a settlement agreement, under which 
Interior withdrew the opinion. Interior agreed to restart the 
administrative review and explicitly rejected reliance on the competition 
by the proposed casino and casinos of other tribes as determinative 
factor. 
I argue that Interior should never have asked, in determining if this 
particular statute was met, whether some other tribe's casino is going to 
suffer economically. I do not mean to suggest that an economic loss of 
advantage does not affect sovereignty and jurisdiction in the ability to 
help people on the reservation, but that is not an appropriate 
consideration for the United States. 
A second example: The new Ho-Chunk Nation Compact with 
Wisconsin requires the state not to concur with any positive 
determination made by the Secretary of Interior that an application 
meets IGRA when the Ho-Chunks have notified the State that the 
operation of the proposed establishment will cause a substantial 
reduction of their gaming revenues at any of the Ho-Chunk Nation's 
gaming facilities. Unless the tribe that wants to open up the new facility 
has entered into a binding indemnification agreement with the Ho-
Chunk Nation to compensate it for loss of revenue, the Ho-Chunk 
Nation is relieved of its obligations to make payments to the State if the 
State concurs without this indemnification agreement. 
Two tribes filed suit against Interior based on this Compact, 
arguing it is unlawful to allow one tribe to interfere with another tribe's 
21. See Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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efforts by giving the right to be free from economic competition. These 
two tribes are seeking off-reservation casinos and the United States 
either affirmatively approved this Compact or let it go into effect 
without action. Again, I do not think this is appropriate. It is picking 
between competing tribes and doing it based on economic advantage. 
The Senecas have the same kind of non-compete exclusive rights 
to gamble within a 25-mile radius in their Compact. There is an 
exception for two non-compacting tribes. The State may negotiate with 
these tribes to establish a gaming facility. However, these two tribes 
argue it is a violation of the trust obligation of the United States to 
include provisions that explicitly restrict the economic opportunities 
that are available to them. Secretary Norton allowed this to take effect 
without secretarial action. In doing so, she agreed that by approving the 
Compact, the Department would essentially ratify an agreement that has 
the effect of restricting the economic opportunities of the Tonawanda 
Band and Tuscarora Nation. She argued, however, it does not violate 
trust obligations because the tribe has no legal right to off-reservation 
gaming under IGRA. She notes that future compacts may pit tribe 
against tribe. So, I think that these two Compacts violate the trust 
responsibility, by which I do not mean that there is an ability to seek 
money damages, but that the United States is inappropriately 
considering the interests of a competing tribe. 
The United States, in considering removed and unremoved nations' 
interests, should contemplate what is best for the purpose of 
strengthening and supporting tribal jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty. If 
that means that the federal government has to ignore what is going to 
happen to another tribe's casino, then so be it. 
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